Hong Kong and Thailand: Where Mass Mobilization is Not Enough
Hong Kong, August 18, 2019 (Getty)
In 2014 and 2019-2020, a series of protests shook both Hong Kong and Thailand. The two Asian states share many similarities. Both are high-middle income countries with regionally high levels of industrialization, infrastructure, and living standards. Both are also hybrid states that hold elections but keep elites firmly in control. This control was threatened in 2014 and 2019-2020 with protests calling for regime change. Yet in both countries and in both time periods, the protests ultimately failed to topple these regimes.
The failure of the protests was surprising, given that they had mobilized large numbers, especially in 2019-2020. In 2014, Thailand’s protests had 1,000 participants; but in 2020, it had 100,000. In 2014, Hong Kong’s protests had 100,000 participants; but in 2020, it had 2,000,000, over 26% of the population. Protest literature suggests that such high levels of mass mobilization enhance a movement’s odds of success by encouraging resilience, tactical innovation, and loyalty shifts. Nonetheless, all four campaigns ultimately failed. Why?
There is no doubt that the larger, later wave of protests in each country were more resilient and innovative. While the 2014 protests in each country lasted a few months, the 2019-2020 movements each lasted almost two years. The 2014 movements employed few tactics: Hong Kong’s primarily used occupations, and Thailand primarily vigils. In contrast, in 2019-2020, both had more protests over more locations and times. Radicals and moderates worked together, as did blue and white collar workers. A range of tactics paired boycotts, strikes, and slowdowns with assemblies, break-ins, and arson.
Despite that, even the large, resilient, and innovative second wave of protests could not secure the third and arguably most important mechanism of success: loyalty shifts. More security force defections did occur in the 2020 movements than the 2014 ones. However, only 10 to 100 security personnel defected in each country, out of tens of thousands. These defections occurred in individual instances with the rank-and-file, but not among the leadership, in groups, or in public. Defections mostly were resignations, retirements, or statements sympathetic to protests. In my assessment, the overall loyalty of the security forces to the government proved critical to the failure of these movements. Why couldn’t protesters win over the security forces?
Causes of Failure
One cause was the preparedness of the police. Both Hong Kong and Thailand boast high numbers of police per 100,000 people and funding per police - this leads to increased incentives for police to stay loyal to the force, and more equipment and training to use their force “effectively.” Indeed, in 2020, police in both countries engaged in a high level of repression, including live ammunition. However, few deaths occurred, giving the impression of an impervious police and a strong state.
Beyond police, both regimes also used militias. Militias are important as they are accountable not to the people (as police nominally are), but to interest groups. This lets the militia deal, and endure, more damage from the populace, acting as a regime’s “shock troops.” Militias used high levels of violence early on. Protesters were more violent towards the militia too. However, militias often are not identifiable (many are in plain clothes), making it difficult for protesters to counter-target them. Militias are not a constant presence either, and can group together to assault protesters and then spread out minutes after. In the four cases, no militia was ever “fraternized” with nor “defected.” This could be due to a lack of information, but may also be the militia’s increased resistance to popular pressure due to the nature of their organization, tactics, and ties.
Counter-protesters were another force, and are citizens who back the government and lend it legitimacy and morale. Counter-protesters numbered 30,000 in Thailand in 2020 and 100,000s in Hong Kong in 2019. Counter-protesters demonstrated deep divides in society, suggesting in Hong Kong and Thailand that there was a 60-40 split between anti and pro government forces. Counter-protesters often fraternized with police, talking to them, handing them water, or paying respects to them. This could increase police morale and turn a government-vs-people situation into an “our people” vs “their people” or a “model citizen” v. “troublemaker” situation in the view of the police.
Finally, a fourth major cause of failure – and an important difference between 2014 and 2020 – was the level of violence. The 2014 movements were nonviolent. The 2020 movements were mostly nonviolent, but incorporated both unarmed (fists, bricks, bottles) and armed (molotovs) violence. Property, including that of the police, public services, and businesses, were destroyed too. For Hong Kong, violence took over the image of the protests, and made a mostly nonviolent movement look like a semi-violent one, although it maintained broad public support. An interesting pattern emerged: the nonviolent protests could attract more members, but some of these new members’ tactics may be more violent, and the violent tactics can overshadow the nonviolent ones.
In short, although mass mobilization can increase the resilience of a movement and help it diversify its tactics, it proved insufficient in both Hong Kong and Thailand. Police preparedness, coupled with the deployment of militias (which are less responsive to mass mobilization) and counter-protesters (whose protests are a rejection of mass mobilization), inhibited loyalty shifts. Moreover, mass mobilization encouraged by nonviolence paradoxically led to violent fringes that troubled the movement’s image.
