Armenia v. Montenegro: How Tactical Diversity Shapes Campaign Success
Armenia, April 18, 2018 (RFE)
In Armenia in 2018, Prime Minister (and former president) Serzh Sargsyan resigned after a month of protests, stating, “[Protest leader] Nikhol Pashinyan was right. I was wrong.”
However, in Montenegro one year later, President Milo Đukanović succeeded in waiting out 11 months of anti-government protests that began in February 2019 to remain in power.
Both revolutions mobilized over 4% of the population, held festive protests, and attracted diverse participants in gender and age. Sargsyan and Đukanović had each continuously ruled for over ten years. Additionally, Armenia and Montenegro are similarly small, and their efforts garnered limited Western media attention and intervention.
Why then did Armenia’s protests succeed in less than a month, while Montenegro’s failed after almost a year?
Hybrid Regimes and Revolutions
According to Freedom House, Armenia and Montenegro fall into a category of states known as hybrid or transitional regimes, defined as, “…electoral democracies where democratic institutions are fragile, and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist.”
Hybrid regimes often have semi-democratically or even democratically elected leaders that consolidate power, causing democratic backsliding. This transitional state characterized Armenia and Montenegro before their uprisings---each country additionally experienced a unique spark that heightened the visibility of their weak institutions.
In Armenia, the kindling was lit when President Sargsyan revealed his intention to become prime minister. Sargsyan had previously made public statements denying any interest in the position after he spearheaded constitutional reforms in 2014 that allowed him to remain in power after his second presidential term.
In response, Nikhol Pashinyan, an opposition leader, began a march through several Armenian cities that culminated in Yerevan. When Sargsyan was officially nominated to be the country’s next prime minister and subsequently elected by parliament, thousands more joined Pashinyan’s protests. After hundreds of arrests by police, failed negotiations, and surprise defections from the military, Sargsyan resigned on April 23, 2018.
Montenegro’s spark took the form of a viral video of President Milo Đukanović allegedly receiving an illegal campaign donation. Đukanović had been in power in various positions for three decades and had long been suspected of corruption. The brazen nature of the supposed dishonesty ignited protests in February 2019.
Montenegro’s political opposition initially supported the uprising, but the movement against Đukanović soon fractured. Interest in the protests waned as uneventful months passed, and the regime eventually escaped relatively unscathed.
The Importance of Tactical Diversity in Armenia
Nonviolence is often touted as the superior form of protest. It arguably boasts several benefits for resistance movements that increase the likelihood of regime transition, including gaining more significant security force defections, international support, and participation, all of which help a movement succeed in toppling a dictator.
Armenia and Montenegro’s campaigns were both nonviolent, but their tactics varied widely. In Armenia, protesters regularly blocked streets with parked cars, thereby paralyzing traffic in the capital of Yerevan and forcing the deployment of hundreds of police officers to clear congestion. This strategy of civil disobedience was instrumental in the victory of Armenia’s opposition movement.
First, it created substantial headaches for the regime. While anti-government protests are troublesome for a dictator, they can often be ameliorated by being ignored. Protests often fizzle when a dictator disregards unrest because of the movement’s internal divisions or a sense that change is hopeless. It becomes increasingly difficult for a dictator to neglect a movement once it creates situations requiring responses, such as traffic blockades or sit-ins.
Second, acts of civil disobedience better engaged participants. Opposition leader Nikhol Pashinyan’s encouragement to block roads with cars and the entrances of government buildings with people gave individuals a more active role, thus decreasing the likelihood of the uprising falling into monotony and losing support.
Importantly, rallies and marches still occurred during the Armenian protests. This allowed for individuals who were unable to join in road blockades, such as the elderly or those without cars, to participate in the movement.
Finally, acts of civil disobedience allowed for greater fraternization with security forces. Blocked roads across Yerevan meant police were spread widely and subsequently less powerful than if they had been congregated to disperse a large gathering. Smaller groups of officers removing cars and arresting protesters on the street made for a less threatening environment for interacting with the police.
The Failure of Montenegro
Without tactics of civil disobedience, Montenegro suffered in three important ways.
First, because civil disobedience tactics did not disperse protesters and police across Podgorica, each group gathered in homogenous crowds. This made for minimal constructive interaction. The only recorded fraternization that could be found was shouted comments by protesters encouraging police to consider their duties and the futures of their children, neither of which led to security force defections.
Furthermore, Montenegro’s pro-democracy uprising became monotonous. Unlike civil disobedience tactics, which create unique, exciting situations with security forces and other protesters, rallies and marches rarely carry the same urgency or adrenaline. This monotony had two connected consequences: first, as the protests became less novel, they began attracting fewer participants; two, the regime was easily able to ignore the uprising as protests shrunk.
Finally, the government was able to dismiss protests because they did not significantly inconvenience the regime. This was partly a result of shrinking protest size, but also because peaceful rallies and marches require minimal response from security forces. Without visible concessions, Montenegrins lost hope in the movement's ability to succeed, and President Đukanović was able to wait until morale had evaporated.
What’s the Prescription?
While there is no foolproof formula for removing a dictator, fraternization with security forces, inconveniencing the regime, and keeping protesters engaged are tactics that increase the likelihood of success.
Focusing on small, implementable goals, such as causing police officers to refrain from repressing a march, can also often be enough to boost group morale and keep movement fracturing at bay. Ultimately, if dictators embark on a strategy of ignoring protests, tactical diversity can keep participants excited, engaged, and resilient.
