In Iraq, Sectarianism Was Central to Revolutionary Failure
Iraq, November 1, 2019 (Source)
In the 2010s, Iraqis organized three major uprisings against distinct authoritarian governments. They demanded improved government services in 2011, equality for Sunnis in 2013, and an end to mass corruption and foreign interference in 2019. Unlike the 2019 movement, the first two uprisings failed to either achieve their primary goals or topple their dictatorial targets. I argue that the central reason for these failures, in contrast to the success of 2019, was sectarianism. Sectarian divisions inhibited unity and stimulated fears of relapse into sectarian civil war. By 2019, however, sectarianism had subsided, contributing to a successful, cross-sectarian revolution.
One damaging aspect of sectarianism was political division. In 2011, Iraqis expressed grievances within ethnically- or religiously-divided movements rather than through one central anti-regime uprising; those movements included the Shiite anti-Al Khalifa protests, the Sadrist anti-American and anti-Al Maliki protests, and a geographically isolated anti-regime Kurdish uprising. Uniting these geographically and temporally distinct demonstrations may have increased their political weight. Unity similarly lacked in 2013’s sectarian protests, which consisted primarily of Sunnis, a minority of the Iraqi population, and included divisive symbols like pictures of Saddam Hussein. Those symbols discouraged support from not only pro-government Shiite groups like Asaib Ahl Al Haq but also initially supportive Shiite figures like Muqtada Al Sadr. The political weight of the uprising was thus similarly limited.
Another damaging aspect of sectarianism was violence. In 2011, Sunni violence sparked counter protests seeking to punish its instigators; in 2013, counterprotests likewise demanded punishment of Izzat Al Dawri, a Sunni military leader from the Baathist government, and improved security against terrorism. Beyond encouraging counter protests, violence directly stifled support for the uprisings. In 2011, for example, both Al Sadr and Ali Al Sistani, Iraq’s leading Shiite religious figure, often discouraged protest participation because of security threats. Thus, violence, too, undermined popular support for the movement.
Beyond undermining domestic support for the 2011 and 2013 uprisings, sectarian violence encouraged US support for Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki both during and before those movements. To be sure, several policy makers and analysts have rejected the effectiveness of US support for democracy promotion. Nonetheless, such support may have been beneficial in Iraq. Unlike in other foreign states, post-2003 Iraq’s political system depended heavily on US input. The United States also played an important role in Al Maliki’s attainment of the Iraqi prime ministership in 2006 and, significantly, his resignation in 2014, which he submitted only a couple months after US encouragement. US support for Iraq’s earlier protest movements, therefore, could have similarly encouraged the resignation of or increased concessions from Al Maliki.
The role of sectarian violence in US support for Al Maliki manifested as early as the late 2000s. During those years, the United States was concerned primarily with securing a deal to remain in Iraq. At the same time, it seemingly enabled the Iraqi leader’s transformation of the country into a police state. The concurrence of these two events suggests that the security needs of the United States may have prompted its overlooking of unfavorable Iraqi regime behavior, which eventually aided the defeat of the 2011 and 2013 movements. US concern with violence led to support for the Iraqi regime at the time of those movements, too. When President Barack Obama was in November 2013 troubled by increased activity from Al Qaeda within Iraq, he invited Al Maliki to the White House despite the Iraqi regime’s commitment of “massacres” against Sunni protesters and congressional concern with the targeting of dissidents. Similarly, at the time the United States was preparing Iraqi security forces for the US withdrawal from Iraq, it dismissed the regime’s killing of dozens of protesters on February 25, 2011. This pattern of US responses suggests that the presence of and desire to defeat sectarian violence encouraged consistent US support for Al Maliki.
The Success of the 2019 Protests
By 2019, however, these aspects of Iraqi sectarianism had declined. First, violence had decreased significantly. Thus, a central rationale for the counter protests, clerical opposition, and US regime support of 2011 and 2013 had weakened. This weakening manifested in the 2019 uprising; it did not face counterprotests and instead received immediate support from Al Sadr and Al Sistani as well as the United States. To be sure, other forms of violence occurred during the 2019 uprising. For example, protesters regularly destroyed public, security, and private property. Nonetheless, such violence received little criticism from the opposition and religious leaders, who instead denounced regime violence. It was also absent from the 2011 and 2013 movements and, therefore, could not have decreased support. These results suggest that the absence of specifically sectarian violence aided the 2019 protest movement.
Second, political division had decreased at the time of the 2019 movement. This decrease resulted partly from sectarian violence’s own development. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Al Qaeda successfully employed sectarian violence to increase civil divisions among Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis. In contrast, after becoming the primary non-state actor within Iraq beginning 2014, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), failed in this effort, instead decreasing those divisions. This decrease likely contributed to the ethnic unity of the 2019 movement. Like popular sectarianism, meanwhile, elite sectarianism declined beginning 2014. After Al Maliki’s departure that year, both the Iraqi leadership, namely the succeeding Prime Ministers Haider Al Abadi and Adel Abdul Mahdi, and political parties, more broadly, increased cross-sectarian cooperation. This decrease in elite division may have contributed to decreased coalescence around distinct political leaders in the 2019 uprising. The decrease of both this coalescence and ethnic disunity in turn enabled an increase in overall unity and a focus on uniform grievances.
Considering its many effects, Iraqi sectarianism evidently undermined the country’s 2011 and 2013 uprisings. Its political aspects discouraged domestic support for those movements, while its violent aspects encouraged US support for the Iraqi regime over democracy. The relative absence of those aspects of sectarianism in 2019, in contrast, helped safeguard that year’s movement. With sectarianism still relatively reduced, a near-term Iraqi protest movement could again succeed.
